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Abstract — The most critical issue in wireless sensor networks
is Secure data transmission. The system performance of WSNs
can be improved by Clustering which is an effective and
practical way to. In this paper, we study a secure data
transmission for cluster-based WSNs (CWSNs), where the
clusters are formed dynamically and periodically. We propose
two Secure and Efficient data Transmission (SET) protocols for
CWSNs, called SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS, by using the
Identity-Based digital Signature (IBS) scheme and the Identity-
Based Online/Offline digital Signature (IBOOS) scheme,
respectively. In SET-IBS, security relies on the hardness of the
Diffie-Hellman problem in the pairing domain. SET-IBOOS
further reduces the computational overhead for protocol
security, which is crucial for WSNs, while its security relies on
the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. We show the
feasibility of the SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS protocols with
respect to the security requirements and security analysis
against various attacks. The calculations and simulations are
provided to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed protocols.
The results show that, the proposed protocols have better
performance than the existing secure protocols for CWSNs, in
terms of security overhead and energy consumption.
Keywords —Cluster-based WSNs, ID-based digital signature,
ID-based online/offline digital signature, secure data
transmission protocol.
I. Introduction
Efficient data transmission is one of the most important
issues in wireless sensor networks. In a network system
wireless sensor networks comprised of spatially distributed
devices using wireless sensor nodes to monitor physical or
environmental conditions, such as sound, temperature, and
motion. The individual nodes are capable of sensing their
environments, processing the information data locally, and
sending data to one or more collection points in a WSN [1].
Meanwhile, many WSNs are deployed in harsh, neglected
and often adversarial physical environments for certain
applications, such as military domains and sensing tasks
with trustless surroundings [2]. Secure and efficient data
transmission is thus especially necessary and is demanded
in many such practical WSNs.
Cluster-based data transmission in WSNs has been
investigated by researchers in order to achieve the network
scalability and management, which maximizes node
lifetime and reduce bandwidth consumption by using local
collaboration among sensor nodes [3]. In a cluster-based
WSN (CWSN), every cluster has a leader sensor node,
regarded as cluster-head (CH).
A CH aggregates the data collected by the leaf nodes (non-
CH sensor nodes) in its cluster, and sends the aggregation
to the base station (BS). The LEACH (Low-Energy
Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) protocol presented by
Heinzelman et al. [4] is a widely known and effective one
to reduce and balance the total energy consumption for
CWSNs. In order to prevent quick energy consumption of
the set of CHs, LEACH randomly rotates CHs among all
sensor nodes in the network, in rounds. LEACH achieves
improvements in terms of network lifetime. Following the
idea of LEACH, a number of protocols have been
presented such as APTEEN [5] and PEACH [6], which use
similar concepts of LEACH. In this paper, for convenience,
we call this sort of cluster-based protocols as LEACH-like
protocols. Researchers have been widely studying CWSNs
in the last decade in the literature. However, the
implementation of the cluster-based architecture
in the real world is rather complicated [7].
Adding security to LEACH-like protocols is challenging,
because they dynamically, randomly and periodically
earrange the network’s clusters and data links [8].
Therefore, providing steady long-lasting node-to-node trust
relationships and common key distributions are inadequate
for LEACH-like protocols (most existing solutions are
provided for distributed
WSNs, but not for CWSNs). There are some secure data
transmission protocols based on LEACH-like protocols,
such as Sec-LEACH [8], GS-LEACH [9] and RLEACH
[10]. Most of them, however, apply the symmetric key
management for security, which suffers from a so-called
orphan node problem [11]. This problem occurs when a
node does not share a pairwise key with others in its





preloaded key ring. In order to mitigate the storage cost of
symmetric keys, the key ring in a node is not sufficient for
it to share pairwise symmetric keys with all of the nodes in
a network. In such a case, it cannot participate in any
cluster, and therefore, has to elect itself as a CH.
Furthermore, the orphan node problem reduces the
possibility of a node joining with a CH, when the number
of alive nodes owning pairwise keys decreases after a long
term operation of the network. Since the more CHs elected
by themselves, the more overall energy consumed of the
network [4], the orphan node problem increases the
overhead
of transmission and system energy consumption by raising
the number of CHs. Even in the case that a sensor node
does share a pairwise key with a distant CH but not a
nearby CH, it requires comparatively high energy to
transmit data to the distant CH.
The feasibility of the asymmetric key management has
been shown in WSNs recently, which compensates the
shortage from applying the symmetric key management for
security [12]. Digital signature is one of the most critical
security services offered by cryptography in asymmetric
key management systems, where the binding between the
public key and the identification of the signer is obtained
via a digital certificate [13]. The Identity-Based digital
Signature (IBS) scheme [13], based on the difficulty of
factoring integers from Identity-Based Cryptography
(IBC), is to derive an entity’s public key from its identity
information, e.g., from its name or ID number. Recently,
the concept of IBS has been developed as a key
management in WSNs for security. Carman [13] first
combined the benefits of IBS and key pre-distribution set
into
WSNs and some papers appeared in recent years [11–13].
The IBOOS scheme has been proposed in order to reduce
the computation and storage costs of signature processing.
A general method for constructing online/offline signature
Schemes were introduced by Even et al. [10]. The IBOOS
Scheme could be effective for the key management in
WSNs. Specifically, the offline phase can be executed on a
sensor node or at the BS prior to communication, while the
online phase is to be executed during communication.
Some IBOOS schemes are designed for WSNs afterwards,
such as [2] and [6]. The offline signature in these schemes,
however, is precomputed by a third party and lacks
reusability, thus they are not suitable for CWSNs
II .PROBLEM STATEMENT
Recently, we have applied and evaluated the key
management Of IBS to routing in CWSNs [7]. In this
paper, we extend Our previous work and focus on
providing efficient secure data communication for CWSNs.
The contributions of this work are as follows.
 We propose two Secure and Efficient data
Transmission (SET) protocols for CWSNs, called
SET-IBS and SETIBOOS, by using the IBS scheme
and the IBOOS scheme, respectively. The key idea of
both SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS is to authenticate the
encrypted sensed data, by applying digital signatures
to message packets, which are efficient in
communication and applying the key management for
security. In the proposed protocols, secret keys and
pairing parameters are distributed and preloaded in all
sensor nodes by the BS initially, which overcomes the
key escrow problem described in ID-based crypto-
systems [2].
 Secure communication in SET-IBS relies on the ID-
based cryptography, in which, user public keys are
their ID information. Thus, users can obtain the
corresponding private keys without auxiliary data
transmission, which is efficient in communication and
saves energy.
 SET-IBOOS is proposed in order to further reduce the
computational overhead for security using the IBOOS
scheme, in which security relies on the hardness of the
discrete logarithmic problem. Both SET-IBS and
SETIBOOS solve the orphan node problem in the
secure data transmission with a symmetric key
management we show the feasibility of the proposed
protocols with respect to the security requirements and
analysis against three attack models. Moreover, we
compare the proposed protocols with the existing
secure protocols for efficiency by calculations and




In this part, we summarize the characteristics of the
proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS protocols. Table I
shows a general summary of comparison of the
characteristics of SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS with prior
ones, in which metrics are used to evaluate whether a
security protocol is appropriate for CWSNs. We explain
each metric as follows.
TABLE I: Comparison of characteristics of the proposed protocols
with other secure data transmission protocols





Key management: The key cryptographies used in the
protocol to achieve secure data transmission, which consist
of symmetric and asymmetric key based security.
• Neighborhood authentication: used for secure access and
data transmission to nearby sensor nodes, by authenticating
with each other. Here, “limited” means the probability of
neighborhood authentication, where only the nodes with
the shared pairwise key can authenticate each other.
• Storage cost: represents the requirement of the security
keys stored in sensor node’s memory.
• Network scalability: indicates whether a security protocol
is able to scale without compromising the security
requirements.
Here, “comparative low” means that, compared with SET-
IBS and SET-IBOOS, in the secure data transmission with
a symmetric key management, the larger network scale
increases, the more orphan nodes appear in the network,
and vice versa [2].
• Communication overhead: the security overhead in the
data packets during communication.
• Computational overhead: the energy cost and
computation efficiency on the generation and verification of
the certificates or signatures for security.
• Attack resilience: the types of attacks that security
protocol can protect against.
Protocol operation
After the protocol initialization, SET-IBS operates in
rounds during communication. Each round consists of a
setup phase and a steady-state phase. We suppose that, all
sensor nodes
Fig.1. Operation in the proposed secure data transmission
know the starting and ending time of each round, because
of the time synchronization. The operation of SET-IBS is
divided by rounds as shown in Figure1, which is similar to
other LEACH-like protocols. Each round includes a setup
phase for constructing clusters from CHs, and a steady-
state phase for transmitting data from sensor nodes to the
BS. In each round, the timeline is divided into consecutive
time slots by the TDMA (time division multiple access)
control [4]. Sensor nodes transmit the sensed data to the
CHs in each frame of the steady state phase. For fair
energy consumption, nodes are randomly selected as CHs
in each round, and other non-CH sensor nodes join clusters
using one-hop transmission, depending on the highest
received signal strength of CHs. In order to elect CHs in a
new round, each sensor node determines a random number
and compares it with a threshold. If the value is less than
the threshold, the sensor node becomes a CH for the
current round. In this way, the new CHs are self-elected
based by the sensor nodes themselves only on their local
decisions, therefore, SETIBS functions without data
transmission with each other in the CH rotations.
Secure Data Transmission with Hierarchical
Clustering





In large scale CWSNs, multi-hop data transmission is used
for transmission between the CHs to the BS, where the
direct communication is not possible due to the distance or
obstacles
between them. The version of the proposed SET-IBS and
SETIBOOS protocols for CWSNs can be extended using
multi-hop routing algorithms, to form secure data
transmission protocols for hierarchical clusters. The
solutions to this extension could be achieved by applying
the following two routing models.
1) The multi-hop planar model: A CH node transmits data
to the BS by forwarding its data to its neighbor nodes, in
turn the data is sent to the BS. We have proposed an energy
efficient routing algorithm for hierarchically clustered
WSNs in [1], and it is suitable for the proposed secure data
transmission protocols.
2) The cluster-based hierarchical method: The network is
broken into clustered layers, and the data packages travel
from a lower cluster head to a higher one, in turn to the BS,
e.g., [2].
PROTOCOL EVALUATION
In this we propose, and first introduce the three attack
models of the adversaries, and provide the security analysis
of the proposed protocols against these attacks. We then
present results obtained from calculations and simulations.
For the network simulations, we use the network simulator
OMNeT++ to simulate SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS, and
we focus on the energy consumption spent on message
propagation and computation.
Security Analysis
In order to evaluate the security of the proposed protocols,
we have to investigate the attack models in WSNs which
threaten the proposed protocols, and the cases when an
adversary (attacker) exists in the network. Afterwards, we
detail the solutions and countermeasures of the proposed
protocols, against various adversaries and attacks.
Attack Models
In this paper, we group attack models into three categories
according to their attacking means as follows, and study
how these attacks may be applied to affect the proposed
protocols
• Passive attack on wireless channel: Passive attackers are
able to perform eavesdropping at any point of the network,
or even the whole communication of the network. Thus,
they can undertake traffic analysis or statistical analysis
based on the monitored or eavesdropped messages.
• Active attack on wireless channel: Active attackers have
greater ability than passive adversaries, which can tamper
with the wireless channels. Therefore, the attackers can
forge, reply and modify messages. Especially in WSNs,
various types of active attacks can be triggered by
attackers, such as bogus and replayed routing information
attack, sinkhole and wormhole attack, selective forwarding
attack, HELLO flood attack, and Sybil attack [2, 13].
• Node compromising attack: Node compromising
Attackers are the most powerful adversaries against the
proposed protocols as we considered. The attackers can
physically compromise sensor nodes, by which they can
access the secret information stored in the compromised
nodes, e.g., the security keys. The attackers also can
change the inner state and behavior of the compromised
sensor node, whose actions may be varied from the premier
protocol specifications.
Solutions to Attacks and Adversaries
The proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS provide different
types of security services to the communication for
CWSNs, in both setup phase and steady-state phase. Both
in SETIBS and SET-IBOOS, the encryption of the message
provides confidentiality, the hash function provides
integrity, the nonce and time-stamps provide freshness, and
the digital signature provides authenticity and non-
repudiation.
• Solutions to passive attacks on wireless channel: In the
proposed SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS, the sensed data is
encrypted by the homomorphic encryption scheme from
[30], which deals with eavesdropping. Thus, the passive
adversaries cannot decrypt the eavesdropped message
without the decryption key. Furthermore, both SET-IBS
and SET-IBOOS use the key management of concrete ID-
based encryption. Based on the DHP assumption
mentioned, the ID-based key management in the proposed
protocols is INDID-CCA secure (semantic secure against
an adaptive ID-based chosen cipher text attack) and IND-
ID-CPA secure (semantic secure against an adaptive ID-
based chosen plaintext attack). As a result, properties of the
proposed secure data transmission for CWSNs settle the
countermeasures to passive attacks.
• Solutions to active attacks on wireless channel: Focusing
on the resilience against certain attacks to CWSNs
mentioned in attack models, SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS
work well against active attacks. Most kinds of attacks are
pointed to CHs of acting as intermediary nodes, because of
the limited functions by the leaf nodes in a cluster-based
architecture. Since attackers do not have valid digital
signature to concatenate with broadcast messages for
authentication, attackers cannot pretend as the BS or CHs
to trigger attacks. Therefore, SETIBS and SET-IBOOS are
resilient and robust to the sinkhole and selective
forwarding attacks, because the CHs being attacked are
capable to ignore all the communication packets with
bogus node IDs or bogus digital signatures. Together with
round-rotating mechanism and digital signature schemes,





SETIBS and SET-IBOOS are resilient to the hello flood
attacks involving CHs.
Solutions to node compromising attacks: In case of
attacks from a node compromising attacker, the
compromised sensor node cannot be trusted anymore to
fulfill the security requirements by key managements. In
the case that the node has been compromised but works
normally, the WSN system needs an intrusion detection
mechanism to detect the compromised node [5], and has to
replace the compromised node manually or abandon using
it. In this part, we investigate the influence of the
remaining sensor nodes, and evaluate the properties only to
that part of the network. Since each round in the protocol
operations terminates in a pre-defined time, SET-IBS and
SET-IBOOS satisfy the property of protocol execution
termination, depending on the local timer of the sensor
nodes. The CH nodes are elected based only on their local
decisions; therefore, both SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS
operate if there exists an active or compromising attacker.
In order to eliminate the compromised sensor node in the
network, all the revoked IDs of compromised nodes will be
broadcast by the BS at the beginning of the current round.
In this way, the compromised nodes can be prevented from
either
electing as CHs or joining clusters in this round.
Furthermore,
using either the IBS scheme or the IBOOS scheme has at
least two advantages. First, it eliminates the utilization of
certificates and auxiliary authentication information.
Therefore, the message overhead for security can be
reduced, especially with IBOOS. Also, because only the
compromised node IDs has to be stored, it requires very
small storage space for the node revocation. Since the
length of a user’s ID is usually only 1∼2 bytes, the storage
of compromised user’s IDs do not require much storage
space.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we first reviewed the data transmission issues
and the security issues in CWSNs. The deficiency of the
symmetric key management for secure data transmission
has been discussed. We then presented two secure and
efficient data transmission protocols respectively for
CWSNs, SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS. We provided
feasibility of the proposed ET-IB Sand SET-IBOOS with
respect to the security requirements and analysis against
routing attacks. SET-IBS and SET-IBOOS are efficient in
communication and applying the ID-based crypto-system,
which achieves security requirements in CWSNs, as well
as solved the orphan node problem in the secure
transmission protocols with the symmetric key
management. Lastly, the comparison in the calculation and
simulation results show that, the proposed SET-IBS and
SET-IBOOS protocols have better performance than
existing secure protocols for CWSNs. With respect to both
computation and communication costs, we pointed out the
merits that, using SET-IBOOS with less auxiliary security
overhead is preferred for secure data transmission in
CWSNs.
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